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THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AND THE
PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL LAW
DAVID W. LOUISELL*
INTRODUCTION: CRIinINAL DISCOVERY AND THE NEED FOR
MORGAN-TYPE ANALYSIS
To crystallize in a few words the motif of a career as varied and
comprehensive as that of Eddie Morgan would in any event be
difficult, but it is doubly so for a life devoted, as his has been, to
stuff as vital and dynamic as procedure and evidence. For me, his
work most fundamentally is to be characterized as a quest for
greater rationality in the adjudicative process. Whether one thinks
of his analysis of the hearsay rule,' or his rationale of the admissions
exception 2 to it, or his treatment of the dead man's statute,3 or his
study of the functions of judge and jury,4 or any other of the numer-
ous facets of his work in the theory and practice of litigation, one
senses the scholar's ultimate struggles to reduce confusion and
promote precision of thought. And one feels that these scholarly
impulses have been undiminished-in fact, that they have been con-
stantly freshened and vitalized-by their coexistence with the prac-
ticing lawyer's mastery of litigation as an art. Perhaps Morgan's
uniqueness lies in the superimposition of the disciplined thought
habits of the systematic theorist, upon the practitioner's understand-
ing. His scientific attention to the trees has not blinded him to the
artist's perception of the forest.5
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Member, Minneso-
ta, New York and District of Columbia bars. I wish to thank my colleague
Albert Ehrenzweig for a critical reading of the manuscript.
1. Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40
HAnv. L. REV. 712 (1927); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 1138 (1935); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177 (1948); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 211 (1954); MORGAN, SoM PROBLmS OF PROOF 106, 141 (1956).
2. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J.
355 (1921); Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L.
REV. 461 (1929); Morgan, Admissions, 12 WAsn. L. REV. 181 (1937); Morgan,
Admissions, 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 18 (1953); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 229 (1954); cf. MORGAN, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAN. L.
REv. 451 (1952).
3. MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 422 (2d ed. 1942);
MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 350 (3rd ed. 1951);
MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 175 (4th
ed. 1957); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 84 (1954).
4. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 42 (1954); MORGAN, SoME PROB-
LEMS OF PROOF 70 (1956).
5. An unbounded admiration for Morgan's analytical and other intellectual
capacities, and for his ability to articulate his concepts with noble precision,
can of course coexist, as is the case with this author, with a skepticism as to
some of his judgment values in evidence and procedure. Respecting con-
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The quest for greater rationality in adjudication today conspicu-
ously confronts the problem of discovery in criminal cases. Generally
in the United States criminal discovery lags far behind its civil
counterpart.6 Why? At least on a theoretical level, the philosophy of
civil discovery-that pretrial disclosure by reducing surprise and
contributing to more accurate fact ascertainment promotes rationality
in litigation-would seem applicable also to criminal cases. None has
more cogently nor realistically stated that philosophy in the context
of the specifics of our adversary system, than Morgan himself:
It is doubtless true that the theory of our adversary system is attractive
in statement. It may be the best we can devise, but it seldom fits the
facts in modern litigation. If it were to operate perfectly, both parties
would have the same opportunities and capacities for investigation, in-
cluding the resources to finance them, equal facilities for producing all
the discoverable materials, equal good or bad fortune with reference to
availability of witnesses and preservation of evidence, and equal per-
suasive skill in the presentation of evidence and argument. The case is
rare where there is even approximate equality in these respects, and there
is no practical method of providing it. But there can be no question
that the system ought to enable each litigant in advance to know the
exact area of dispute and to have access to all available data, so that
he may be aware in just what particulars he and his adversary disagree,
that he may investigate and determine the pertinency and value of any
materials favorable or unfavorable to his contention, and that he may
consider the reliability of the persons willing or compellable to testify.
Until he knows what state or states of fact the trier may find, he cannot
prepare upon the substantive law. Until he knows what evidence is
likely to be available for or against him, he cannot prepare to meet or
interpose objections under the complex rules governing competency of
witnesses, privileges of parties and witnesses, and the admissibility of
unprivileged relevant evidence. So long as a party may divert the inquiry
from the elements bona fide in dispute, or conceal the real crux of his
claim or defense, and thereby take his opponent by surprise, so long
fidential communications, for example, compare Morgan, Suggested Remedy
for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHi. L. Rnv.
285, 286-92 (1943); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code
of Evidence, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 145, 150 (1940) with Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL, L. REv.
101, 109 (1956); Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. RE.
413 (1956). Respecting the desirability of neutral expert witnesses, compare
Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules
of Evidence, 10 U. Cai. L. REv. 285, 293 (1943) with Lousell, Book Review, 45
CAiIF. L. REV. 572 (1957); cf. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert,
3 ARcaIVEs OF CRI. PSYCHODYNAMvICs 221 (1959).
6. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 56 (1961) [hereinafter cited simply as Dilemma] briefly considers the
present status of criminal discovery in England, at 64, and in our federal juris-
diction, at 68, and treats the California situation in detail, at 74-86. A bibli-
ography of criminal discovery is contained in Dilemma 57 n.2, and 59 n.9. The
Appendix to this article is devoted to the present status of criminal dis-
covery in most of the states of the Union. For a current comprehensive
discussion of discovery, including brief treatment of criminal discovery, see
Note, 74 HARv. L. REv, 942, 1051-63 (1961).
[ VOL. 14
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
will the description of a trial as a battle of wits between contending
counsel have a large measure of truth, and a distinguished judge like
Jerome Frank may with much justification express the opinion that a
lawsuit is a game of chance. The first step toward making a lawsuit a
rational proceeding for discovering the factual basis of a controversy is
acceptance of [the discovery] provisions of the Federal Rules. The next
is a complete renovation of the rules of evidence.7
Morgan's "first step" to rationality now has more than a generation
of history behind it so far as federal civil procedure is concerned, and
is taken many times over as state after state adopts for civil cases the
federal civil discovery rules.8 But in criminal cases the story is
different. It is true, as Professor Fletcher recently pointed out, that
"within the last three years alone, there have been five state appellate
decisions recognizing or ordering discovery in a criminal case for the
first time."9 It is also true that the growth of criminal discovery in
California during the last five years, the case by case work of the
courts, has been little short of phenomenal, as I recently noted in
some detail.'0 But generally on the American scene, the picture is
different; criminal discovery, at least in terms of the five chief
formal techniques of civil discovery," either does not exist or lags
far behind.12 Most surprising of all, perhaps, is the fact that Cali-
fornia, which did not catch up with federal civil discovery practice
until its legislature adopted in 1958 the federal civil discovery rules, 13
7. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 34-35 (1956).
8. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 26-37. As to adoption by various states of federal
civil discovery practice, see generally 2 BuscH, LAw Am TAcTics IN JURY
TRIALS § 211 (1959); LOuIsELL & WLL=AmS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES ff 10.02 (1960); 6 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1856 (3d ed. 1940); id. Supp.
1957; Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 59 CoLum. L REV. 435,
n.2 (1958); Weinstein, Gleit & Kay, Procedures for Obtaining Information
Before Trial, 35 TExAS L. REv. 481 (1957); Wright, Procedural Reform in
the States, 24 F. R. D. 85 (1959). For a comprehensive bibliography of
articles on discovery practice in the various states, see LouISELL & WILLAMS,
op. cit. supra, If 10.02 n.16. Chapter X of the last cited work, and Louisell,
Discovery Today, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 486 (1957) contain detailed illustrations
of the integrated use of the various discovery devices. For a comprehensive
discussion of all phases of discovery in civil cases, federal and state, see 4
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE 11 26.23-26.25 (2d ed. 1950).
9. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv.
293, 297 (1960).
10. Dilemma 59, 74. But even in California there still is no criminal dis-
covery by means of depositions of witnesses. Clark v. Superior Court, 190
A.C.A. 820, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1961).
11. As provided for, e.g., in FED. R. Civ. PROC. 26-37: oral and written
depositions of parties and witnesses with or without subpoenas or subpoenas
duces tecum; interrogatories to adverse parties; motions for inspection and
copying; physical and mental examinations; and demands for admissions.
See Louisell, Discovery and Pre-trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 633 (1952); Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CAL=F. L. REV. 486 (1957).
12. See Dilemma and authorities cited therein esp. at 57 n.2, and 59 n.9;
see also note 6 supra, and the Appendix to this article.
13. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 2016-35 adopted in 1957 and effective January
1, 1958 substantially enacts FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26-37. For a detailed discussion
of the California law, with particular reference to the difference between it
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has by the common law method so far advanced its criminal discovery
that "federal criminal discovery, far from being the leader, is now a
lagger, certainly vis-a-vis California ... "14
If Morgan were commencing his career today, would he wield his
typically powerful weapons, sharpened on the anvil of his incisive
analysis, to the end that criminal discovery would catch up with
civil? Of this I feel sure: before he would wield weapons, he would
focus shafts of light. It was not until after he had achieved a mastery
of the hearsay rule unexcelled in the history of Anglo-American
law that he made bold to urge its complete overhauling.5
I have recently characterized one of the historic formulae for
denying criminal discovery-that it would wholly subvert criminal
law administration-as "reflecting attitude more than analysis."'16
Such general deprecations of discovery are no longer enough; modern
legal sophistication-certainly the Morgan type-demands greater
precision. Another of the historic objections to criminal discovery-
that it would lead to intolerable perjury and tampering with docu-
ments and items of real evidence and hence promote the fabrication
of wholly false defenses-was perhaps most cogently put, surprisingly
enough, by the reformer Chief Justice Vanderbilt.17 But essentially
this objection proceeds from the premise that potential abuse con-
demns a device, a principle that we have largely and wisely-al-
though by no means wholly' 8 -discarded in procedural law, as witness
the modem capacity of parties to testify.19 The premise is no more
valid for criminal discovery than for other legal institutions.
But the third of the historic reasons for denying criminal discovery
-that it is unfair because any just system of disclosure presupposes
mutuality which is impossible with criminal discovery because of
our rule against compulsory self-incrimination 20-- gives pause. One
need not rest resistance to this argument on the notion now fre-
quently advanced that "to deny production on the ground that an
and the federal rules, see Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 486
(1957).
14. Dilemma 74.
15. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 106, 141, and esp. 193-95 (1956).
16. Dilemma 57.
17. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A. 2d 881, 884 (1953).
18. Not wholly, as is most acutely evident from the so-called "dead man's"
statutes. See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVI-
DENCE 175 (4th ed. 1957).
19. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 74 (1954). The Supreme Court's
latest word on this problem appears in Ferguson v. Georgia, 29 U.S.L. WEEK
4281 (U.S. March 27, 1961) (counsel of defendant in criminal case in Georgia,
where defendant is incompetent as a witness but eligible to make an unsworn
statement, cannot constitutionally be precluded from questioning defendant).
20. E.g., State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910); see
Dilemma 87; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1197 (1960).
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imbalance would be created between the advantages of prosecution
and defense would be to lose sight of the purpose of a trial, which
is the ascertainment of the truth; nondisclosure partakes of the
nature of a game."'21 After all, to the extent that our criminal law
administration is adversary, it, like civil law administration, naturally
occasions in respect to discovery the problem of balancing as be-
tween adversaries the potential for fact ascertainment (although one
can hardly argue that adversariness as such is the ultimate value of
any rational system of adjudication, and certainly not of criminal
law administration).22 Perhaps a more important point, at least
pragmatically, is that, viewing discovery realistically in the context
of the total criminal investigatory process, often on fair appraisal of
all relevant factors it would be found not to effect a true imbalance
between prosecution and defense.23 At least, when one considers the
total investigative capacities of the state including access to scientific
data and their interpretation,24 the formal and actual limitations on
the self-incrimination principle,25 and the constitutional capacity of
legislatures to require from a defendant advance knowledge of the
nature of his defense,26 there seems to be no intrinsic reason why
criminal discovery must inevitably produce too gross an imbalance
to be tolerable in an adversary system.
But if within a given jurisdiction the recognition of formal dis-
covery rights in a defendant would imbalance to his undue favor his
posture vis-a-vis the state's, further alternatives apparently are
available to restore the balance, as suggested by a recent California
case, McCain v. Superior Court.27 In that case, a prosecution for
exciting the lust of a child, defendant moved for pretrial discovery
of certain information in the hands of the prosecution, including
21. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959); see
also Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 699-700
'(1957); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
22. Dilemma 93, 97, 102.
23. Dilemma 60, 87.
24. On the significance of scientific data and their interpretation in modern
adjudication, see LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, THE PARENCEYMA OF LAW ch. 16
(1960).
25. Dilemma 87.
26. A number of states require a defendant who relies on the defense of
insanity to plead explicitly that defense. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016; see
also WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 357-59 (1954).
Fourteen states now have statutes providing that an accused who intends to
rely upon alibi as a defense must give notice of his intention to the prose-
cution a specified number of days before trial. The relevant code provisions
of these states are cited in Dilemma 61 n.13. Needless to say, any appraisal
of criminal discovery as a factor in the balance between the state and the
accused must, in order to approach accuracy, not only take account of all
the weights on the scales, but must also consider each jurisdiction as a
separate problem. See Dilemma 86.
27. 184 A.C.A. 853, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960). [A.C.A. is the abbreviation for
Advance California Appellate Reports.]
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recordings of statements made to police officers by defendant. The
prosecution countered with a discovery motion against the defendant
requesting, as a condition precedent to the granting of defendant's
motion, that defendant be ordered to disclose "all original notes or
documents or writings which contain statements . . . of witnesses or
any tape recordings or writings by witnesses or any documents or
photographs expected to be used as evidence in the trial,"28 excepting
attorney-client confidential communications. At the hearing the judge
inquired of the defendant as to whether he had any objection to the
granting of the prosecution's motion in conjunction with the granting
of his motion. After some discussion and a continuance of several
days defendant through his counsel indicated when the motions
again were before the court that he was ready to submit to whatever
orders the court might make. The court thereupon granted both
orders for pretrial discovery on a "reciprocal contemporaneous basis."
Defendant and the prosecution then exchanged materials. Later that
day defendant by his counsel invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination and other constitutional privileges,29 but no change was
made in the discovery order.
When the case was called for trial defendant moved for a dismissal,
relying on section 1324 of the California Penal Code which provides
that when a person furnishes incriminating information under a
court order he is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The mo-
tion for dismissal was denied and defendant sought prohibition against
proceeding with the trial, a device procedurally correct in California.
Prohibition was denied because defendant by consenting to the dis-
covery order waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Hence,
his production of materials was deemed not to have been made
pursuant to the statute's mandate with its concomitant immunization
from prosecution, but pursuant to the waiver of the constitutional
right, which had been invoked only after the waiver and therefore
too late. The court said:
Respondent and People contend, on several grounds, that there was no
violation of petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination. The follow-
ing ground appears decisive. Neither petitioner nor his counsel claimed
the privilege prior to the time the trial court granted both motions on a
"reciprocal contemporaneous basis" and in fact have waived any claim
of privilege by stating: "The defendant is here and ready to submit to
whatever orders your Honor makes." Following the order of the court
granting the motions of both defendant and the People, defendant, through
28. 184 A.C.A. at 855, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
29. Defendant invoked under the U.S. Constitution the searches and seizures
provision of the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
and due process provisions, and the fourteenth amendment. He also invoked
the California constitution's provisions respecting self-incrimination and due
process. 184 A.C.A. at 856, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
[Vor,. 14
CRIMINAL .DISCOVERY
his attorney, complied and voluntarily handed over the material in
question without making any objection to the ruling or to compliance
therewith. The subsequent attempt of defendant's attorney to register
his objections to the granting of the People's motion came too late to be
effective for the order had already been executed.30
It would seem, therefore, that the self-incrimination principle is not
an insuperable barrier to all significant development of criminal dis-
covery. Likely it is to other factors-some chiefly psychological in
nature, and the most important one the existence of organized crime
in the United States-that we must turn for more adequate explana-
tion of criminal discovery's lag behind its civil counterpart.
CRmnAL DISCOVERY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL PRACTICE
It is easy enough to state, as some courts now do in justifying
criminal discovery, that "nondisclosure partakes of the nature of a
game"; 31 or as I have stated, "adversariness as such is not the
ultimate value of our legal system, certainly not of criminal law
administration. Adversariness is only a means to ascertainment of
the facts, and must be subordinated to the substantive objective when
that means fails to promote the objective as efficiently as competing
means would promote it."32 But the fact is that in the psychology
of American prosecution, adversariness looms large, and not wholly
so for reasons attributable to prosecutors' orneriness. For despite
the encroachments on the adversary principle, especially in criminal
law administration, a trial is still a contest between opponents, not an
inquiry conducted by neutrals. As the late Mr. Justice Jackson put it:
"[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceed-
ing."33 A distinguished former prosecutor, of unimpeachable integrity
and ethical standards, recently remarked to the author:
If I were to investigate a criminal case today in California, I would
30. 184 A.C.A. at 857, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 843. The court's conclusions derive
support, doubtless essential, from the fact that criminal discovery is not yet
required by due process. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Cicenia v.
LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). The allowance of one constitutional right hardly
could be conditioned on the waiver of another. Cf. Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149,
1197 (1960).
31. E.g., Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959).
32. Dilemma 102.
33. In his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947).
Cf. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 1 (1956): "The theory of our adversary
system of litigation is that each litigant is most interested and will be most
effective in seeking, discovering, and presenting the materials which will
reveal the strength of his own case and the weakness of his adversary's case
so that the truth will emerge to the impartial tribunal that makes the
decision." For a recent consideration of the functions of the judge in the
context of an adversary trial, see the opinion of Woodbury, Chief Judge, for
the court in In re United States, 286 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961).
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do so upon the assumption that much of what I discovered, if not every-
thing, would be in imminent peril of discovery. Since I am a product of
the adversary system, I would do everything possible to limit and
restrict what the defense might compel me to disclose. If any disclosure
was to be made, I would want to exercise control over it. I'm sure that I
could protect my situation pretty effectively, that is, I could frustrate
all of the supposedly noble purposes of discovery. And that is just what
law enforcement people are trying their best to do. Hope for change
must lie in your suggestion for reciprocity. There's a lot to be said for
the well known quid pro quo.
To the extent that the aforequoted objection proceeds from an
assumed excessive imbalance occasioned by the lack of mutuality
consequent upon the self-incrimination rule, in principle it should
dissipate within any given jurisdiction if the reality is that granting
formal discovery devices to defendant, in the context of the total
fact-ascertainment process, would not unduly handicap the state.
34
Moreover, the prosecutor quoted above himself seems to acknowledge
that there is in the doctrine of McCain v. Superior Court,35 considered
supra, the potential for adequate correction of his assumed imbalance.
Obviously, the prosecution profession's antipathy to criminal dis-
covery will be mollified more by the McCain-type pragmatic ap-
proach, than by the jurisprudential consideration that "the ultimate
question [as to criminal discovery's acceptability] is, or should be,
not simply whether discovery tends to tilt the scales, but whether
it tends to tilt them to a right conclusion.136
That prosecutors generally evidence strong antipathy to those de-
velopments of criminal discovery which already have occurred in
some places is made clear by attendance at almost any of their
formal meetings, as well as by their informal discussion. If the
dangers they typically foresee are inevitable concomitants of growth
of discovery, the prospect for the increased rationality in criminal
law that discovery theoretically presents is dismal indeed. Today in
California, the state of greater growth of criminal discovery, one
hears rumblings that the prosecutor-envisaged dangers are already
upon us. One district attorney in a large metropolitan area, who
formerly made it a practice to tape all of his office interviews with
prospective witnesses, is reported to have dropped the practice with
the growth of discovery orders. Thus is raised the threat of increasing
reliance on recollection in substitution for record keeping. Indeed,
the threat is not only that records will not be made, but that those
made will conveniently be destroyed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing for four members of the Court recently stated in Campbell v.
34. Dilemma 60, 87.




United States:37 "Nothing in the legislative history of the [Jencks]
Act remotely suggests that Congress' intent was to require the
Government, with penalizing consequences, to preserve all records
and notes taken during the countless interviews that are connected
with criminal investigation by the various branches of the Govern-
ment." One is reminded of the observation of Mr. Justice Murphy,
for the Court in Hickman v. Taylor:38 "Were such materials [counsel's
memoranda] open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten." The
answer, it seems to me, lies in the development in criminal dis-
covery of the Hickman "work product" rubric, 39 besides, of course,
judicial insistence on the duty of candor of prosecutors implicit in
the basic norm of prosecution, that its primary function is not to
convict but to see that justice is done.
40
Another of the psychological hurdles to prosecutors' acceptance of
criminal discovery lies in the fear that it will eventuate in their
"doing all the work." Something of this feeling appears in the recent
case of People v. Cooper,41 wherein the California Supreme Court
possibly indicated a swing of the pendulum respecting its attitude
toward criminal discovery after its great forward strides of the
last five years. For there the court in upholding denial of pretrial
discovery said that to obtain it defendant must show some better
cause "than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which
has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.
'42
While I think the threat that discovery will promote indolence of
defendants' lawyers is overdrawn, one need not share the prosecutor's
psychology to acknowledge that "if diligence in preparing for trial,
whether civil or criminal, is with any substantial number of lawyers
an inverse function of the efficiency of discovery-if the zeal in pre-
paring one's own case diminishes according as he is able to raid
his opponent's workshop-then, indeed, in such indolence would
there be danger that we would end with unilateral inquiry only into
the facts. The essence of the adversary principle would be gone."4&
One occasionally hears nowadays similar complaints respecting civil
discovery, although the latter by reason of its inherent mutuality
would seem better able to generate its own defenses against indolence.
37. 365 U.S. 85, 102 (1961).
38. 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
39. Louisell, Discovery and Pre-trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 633, 635 (1952). The problem of failing to record data, and destroying
them, may be even more serious respecting police files. See Dilemma 91, esp.
n.161; id. 74 n.75.
40. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs No. 5.
41. 53 Cal. 2d 755, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964 (1960).




Perhaps the comprehensive survey in prospect of the actual workings
of civil discovery, under the auspices of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules,44 will shed much light on the problem, for criminal as
well as civil cases, of alleged discovery-induced indolence of counsel.
In the meantime, courts should be alert against exaggerated claims
that discovery is producing a generation of slothful attorneys. Cer-
tainly those who would curtail civil discovery on the "diligence"
argument are conspicuous in neither number nor vigor.45
A factor that looms as an additional danger, not only in the psy-
chology of the prosecutor but in that of the student of judicial ad-
ministration as well, concerns potential proliferation of collateral
issues in criminal cases as a consequence of discovery. The current
term of the United States Supreme Court hardly assuages fears in
this regard as Campbell v. United States,46 involving application of
the so-called Jencks legislation, 47 demonstrates. Campbell, like the
Jencks case48 itself, involved at-trial rather than pretrial discovery.
But it is my view that although the timing of the discovery at-
tempt has obvious significance-e.g., significance respecting possible
abuse, in that information furnished before trial may occasion greater
opportunity for facilitation of perjury than when furnished only at
trial-nevertheless both pretrial and at-trial discovery present es-
sentially an integral problem, and it is fair to consider discovery's
potential proliferation of collateral issues in the context of either type
of disclosure.49
In Campbell, a prosecution of defendants for bank robbery, an eye
witness identified one of the defendants at the trial and on cross-
examination said that an FBI agent who had interviewed him during
the week following the robbery had written down a statement which
the trial judge first held was producible under the Jencks Act. As a
result of the witness's further testimony, and government counsel's
representations as to what he possessed by way of a statement, the
trial judge finally ruled that the government need not produce any
statement. The case ended up in the Supreme Court as a fight over
whether there ever was a statement possessed by the government
producible under the Jencks Act; if so, whether the government had
destroyed it; whether a writing the government admittedly did have
was a producible one; whether the trial court sua sponte should have
called an FBI agent to enlighten it on these points, or left this task to
44. Under the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States.
45. Dilemma 94.
46. 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).




defendants themselves as a part of their adversary function; and
whether the government witness, for whose impeachment the state-
ment was sought, should himself have been the judge of whether the
statement was discoverable to impeach him! Although all the justices
concurred in the conclusion that the case had to be remanded to the
district court for further appraisal as to whether there was in fact
a statement producible under the Jencks Act, the Court split five to
four on the rationale for the remand. It similarly split on the problem
-or at least one phase of it-of whether the trial judge should have
called the FBI agent as a court's witness or left the onus of getting
his testimony on defendants. An intelligent layman, unacquainted
with the complexities generated by the Jencks case, its judicial
aftermath,5 0 the attempted congressional palliative now popularly
called the Jencks legislation, and the latter's construction in Palermo
v. United States,51 might well react to all the collaterality upon which
Campbell turned by crying: If this be discovery, let's have no more of
it!
Still, had the statement been discoverable before trial rather than
its discovery precluded by the Jencks legislation-or had the FBI
agent presumably in possession of the controlling facts on produci-
bility been subject to a pretrial deposition to ascertain the nature of
the statement-it is arguable that the collateral matters might have
been substantially threshed out before the trial ever commenced.
If so, the unfortunate turn of the Campbell litigation was not be-
cause of discovery, but because of undue limitations on it.
Clancy v. United States52 affords another recent instance where
collateral issues under the Jencks Act dominated outcome in the
Supreme Court. This was a prosecution for tax evasion in the
operation of a horse race booking enterprise. Government agents
who interviewed defendants took no notes at the time but afterwards
prepared memoranda of the interviews. The trial judge denied the
defense's motion for production at trial of these memoranda because
they had not been made "contemporaneously" with the interviews.
In the Supreme Court the government conceded this was error;
because the government agents had become witnesses at the trial,
their own memoranda became producible to the extent they were
relevant to the direct testimony at the trial. The trial court's error,
however, is understandable-and unfortunately similar errors likely
will continue to be made-because of the complexity of the concept
of compulsory producibility under the Jencks Act. Thus, a govern-
ment witness's statement is discoverable after he testifies at the trial,
50. Dilemma 64 n.25.
51. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
52. 365 U.S. 312 (1961).
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to the extent it is relevant to his testimony, if it is a written state-
ment made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by him (or, as now stated in Campbell, supra, if it is a copy
of such a statement),53 or if it is "a stenographic, mechanical, electri-
cal, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness
to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement."54 Apparently in Clancy
the trial judge thought of the memoranda as merely governmental
resum6s of the defendants' statements, overlooking that the govern-
ment agents themselves had become witnesses so as to make their
own statements producible under the Jencks Act.
Although the Court unanimously accepted the government's con-
cession of error respecting producibility of the memoranda, it split
six to three as to disposition of the case, the majority reversing for
a new trial, the minority favoring remand for determination as to
whether defendants' counsel actually had received the requested
memoranda. Thus disposition really turned upon the purely collateral
factual issue as to whether the requested memoranda actually had
been passed to the defense at the trial.
True, the Jencks Act is comparatively recent; it became effective
only September 2, 1957. Perhaps the common law method of case
to case decision will yet make acceptable and workable, from the
viewpoint of judicial administration, its complex formula. At this
point it would seem that something will have to give: either that
formula itself, or the act's preclusion of pretrial discovery with its
potential for clearing up collateral issues.55
ORGANIZED, PROFESSIONAL AND CONSPIRATORIAL CRIME
The considerations discussed in the preceding section probably
pale in significance as barriers to growth of criminal discovery, when
compared with the hurdle interposed by the fact of organized crime
in the United States. I have little doubt that society could afford
substantial development of criminal discovery in the typical case, to
the end that sheer surprise as an element in outcome would be as
effectively reduced in criminal as it now is in civil litigation where
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or their state counterparts pre-
vail.56 But what of prosecutions in the field of organized, professional
53. 365 U.S. at 93 (1961).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (2) (1958).
55. Of course, it must candidly be acknowledged that pretrial discovery,
even-if- of -ideal-scope, might not in a given case clear up all collateral issues;
indeed, the range of issues potentially implicit in the case may not be




and conspiratorial crime? Do the defendant, his attorney, and fellow
members of his criminal syndicate, present hurdles too high for
criminal discovery's leap?
This is a delicate question difficult to write about, but one that
intellectual candor dictates that we face. The difficulty is com-
pounded by the danger that remarks about criminal lawyers will
be misconstrued. Nothing would be more wrongful than a general
disparagement of attorneys who appear for defendants in criminal
cases. Often their professional standards are in every respect just
as high ethically as those of their civil counterparts. Often they
appear out of motives primarily of public service rather than financial
profit. Except in the District of Columbia, they still work for nothing
when they appear by assignment in federal court. Rather than gen-
eral disparagement of those lawyers who refuse wholly to shun
criminal law administration, and hence at least occasionally appear
for defendants in criminal cases, what is needed is disparagement of
a certain attitude of disdain among a portion of the American bar
to everything pertaining to criminal law. The English bar does
not seem to me to have that attitude; barristers in every sense
eminent often appear in criminal cases.
But the fact cannot be gainsaid that among the practitioners in
American criminal courts are those who not only represent defendants
from criminal enterprises as trial counsel but fall-almost inevitably
it would seem-into the tragic plight of acting as advisors to the
criminal enterprises to which their clients belong. A criminal syndi-
cate's lawyer may stop at almost nothing to gain the syndicate's ob-
jective or, whatever his personal principles, may be overwhelmed
by the pressures emanating from the gang, or the latter's more or
less independent acts of subornation of perjury, getting rid of state's
witnesses, and the like. As illustrative, I select the observations made
in 1915 by a justice of the court which in the last five years has
effected the greatest development of criminal discovery in the
United States-the California Supreme Court:
The court could not have done justice to the state, as well as to the
petitioner, if it failed to keep in mind the common experience in the
administration of criminal justice, that in relation to crimes involving
conspiracy and confederation those who plan them remain in the back-
ground, while reckless tools are sent forth to do the actual work under
promises of reward, protection, and defense. If exposure follows, the
men who actually committed the criminal act are alone brought to the
bar of justice. Then an attorney, chosen by the heads of the enterprise,
appears to defend them. Deference is generally paid to appearances by
having one attorney for each individual. If conviction follows, the leaders
in the background are naturally anxious about the outcome. Will the
district attorney be able to obtain confessions from the men already in
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the toils of the law, and, in that way, develop all the facts of the crime
and reach out for the prime conspirators? In such circumstances the
advantage of hiring an attorney to guide the criminals already in the
clutches of the law can hardly be exaggerated. What would be the con-
ception of duty on the part of an attorney who would, in such a situation,
accept employment to represent the two sets of malefactors? This is
not an unusual experience by any means, as every one familiar with
criminal litigation is aware.57
On informal occasions, district attorneys will state, almost boast,
that in fact they are willing freely to open up their files for in-
spection by defendant's counsel, when the latter is considered trust-
worthy in the sense that he would not be a party to subornation of
perjury or an illegally fabricated defense, or kindred tactics. An
outsider like the writer, whose experience in criminal cases always
has been at the defendant's side of the table, is naturally skeptical
as to whether files are in fact so freely opened; whether such volun-
tary disclosure is not done most typically in cases where the prosecu-
tor believes that sharing the information may induce a plea of guilty.
But in any event, can a prosecutor be blamed for resisting pretrial
disclosure to a lawyer who represents a defendant fairly to be charac-
terized as from the "professional criminal class"?
In attempting to tackle this problem I recently said, after asking
the question whether criminal discovery reform generally in the
United States must be held at bay by the fact of organized crime:
Rather, it would seem that the law should take account of these
realities, and draw the line between typical, and organized, crime. In
the usual criminal case, the norm would be discovery as full-fledged as
that which now characterizes civil litigation in federal court and those
many jurisdictions which have emulated the federal civil discovery rules.
Discovery, however, would be withheld, or perhaps allowed subject to
restrictions, upon a showing by the state that by reason of the nature
of the accused's associations and representatives, it would likely lead
to improper uses such as threats to witnesses, hired or professional per-
jury, or the like. Among such restrictions might be delaying the time of
allowance of discovery, e.g., allowing it only shortly before trial so as
to reduce to a minimum chance for interference with state witnesses. Or,
waiver of the self-incrimination privilege might be imposed as a con-
dition of discovery on applicants representing the professional criminal
groups, although not generally imposed. Undoubtedly this approach
would necessitate a measure of "trial court discretion," but it would be a
discretion delimited by some tangible, objective considerations. It would
be something like the kind of discretion apparently appropriate in fixing
the amount of bail. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 46 (c),
which may be taken as representative, provides that if defendant is
57. Lawlor, J., dissenting in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 247, 149 Pac.
566, 572 (1915). See also Abbott v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177
P.2d 317 (1947); People v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc 714 270 N.Y.
Supp. 362 (1934), ajf'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1659 (1934).
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admitted to bail the amount shall be such as will insure his presence
"having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the
defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant." Under this
standard, one court considered, inter alia, that defendant when appre-
hended was in the company of a bail-jumper and was a person "without
respect for legal processes." 58 Other courts have deemed significant
defendant's character and reputation,59 his criminal record,60 his "con-
sistent pattern of behavior," 61 and the extensive criminal operations of
the defendant.62 Douglas, J., in recently denying without prejudice a
bail application pointed out that "this traditional right to freedom during
trial and pending judicial review has to be squared with the possibility
that defendant may flee or hide himself."63 This seems to be the kind of
practical appraisal in which are relevant defendant's connections and
associations, whether law abiding or not, as they are relevant to the
likelihood vel non of abuse of criminal discovery.64
Since the foregoing was written there has appeared another help-
ful opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in Fernandez v. United States,
65
involving prosecution for conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics
laws, wherein the justice denied applications for restoration to bail
from defendants whose bail had been revoked during trial by the
trial judge. The latter had rested his revocation on a number of
trial incidents, including "alleged threats made in the courtroom by
three of the defendants to a government witness while he was in the
process of identifying various defendants; alleged tampering with
another government witness, not connected up, however, with any
of the defendants; a trial interruption of about a week occasioned
by injuries to one of the defendants resulting from what the Govern-
ment suspected was a contrived automobile accident; [and] bail
jumping on the eve of trial by one of the charged defendants,
requiring his severance from the case .... -66 Harlan refused to ad-
mit the applicants to bail, stating that on balance he was unable to
say that the action of the trial judge in remanding defendants was
arbitrary.
Effectuation for purposes of criminal discovery of a reasonable
distinction between the typical criminal defendant, and the defendant
from the realms of organized crime, probably would be best achieved,
58. United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), bail reduced,
231 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1956).
59. Ex parte Jagles, 44 Nev. 370, 195 Pac. 808 (1921).
60. People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930).
61. In re Morehead, 107 Cal. App. 2d 346, 237 P.2d 335 (1951).
62. Cf. Ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 277 App. Div. 546, 101
N.Y.S.2d 271 (1950) (material witness).
63. Bandy v. United States, 364 U.S. 477 (1960).
64. Cf. Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 685 (1958).
65. 81 Sup. Ct. 642 (1961).
66. 81 Sup. Ct. at 643.
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from the viewpoint of the mechanics of litigation, by putting the
burden on the prosecution to show why a discovery order which
would be proper in the typical case, should be withheld because of
involvement of organized crime.67 Prompt review of pretrial dis-
covery orders would in the long run likely be sound judicial economy;
certainly the prompt review afforded in California by writ of man-
date seems to work efficiently.68
CONCLUSION
I suspect that Morgan might favor a policy of discretion in the
trial judge more comprehensive than I have delineated-perhaps even
a discretion broad enough to grant or withhold pretrial disclosure
wholly without regard to my distinction between typical and or-
ganized crime. If so, in logic there would be support for him, as
always. For it is arguable that it is not only in the professional
crime situation, but in all cases where the witnesses are friendly or
subservient to the defendant, that discovery is inimical to efficient
prosecution by unduly imbalancing the scales; that this happens for
example in the simple drunk driving case. But I doubt whether, in
the simple drunk driving case for example, reasonable discovery
rights in the defendant would in fact unduly imbalance the scales.
To the contrary, it seems to me that in that type of case the
prosecution's increasing facilities for scientific aids necessitate
criminal discovery for a fair trial, at least to the extent of data
pertaining to scientific tests. Therefore in that kind of situation,
discovery should be a matter of right, not of trial court discretion.
Indeed, in the generality of criminal cases some measure of discovery
often seems essential to fairness and therefore should be accorded as
of right, absent controlling considerations pertinent to likely abuse
of discovery. In a word, where considerations of fairness indicate
discovery, and there are no substantial countervailing considerations,
defendant's capacity to get it should not depend on his "luck of the
draw" at motions calendar. My own experience has made me acutely
aware that the warning of Holt, C.J.-"discretionary" is "but a softer
word for arbitrary"- 69 was not only for his time, but for the ages,
67. Clearly we must do better with problems of machinery and definition
than New Jersey did in defining a "gang" as "consisting of two or more
persons," producing a standard so vague as to violate due process. Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). And we must be ever-mindful of the
implications of the caution of Clark, Circuit Judge, in concurring in United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 420 (2d Cir. 1960): "For in America we
still respect the dignity of the individual, and even an unsavory character is
not to be imprisoned except on definite proof of specific crime."
68. Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); Dilemma
78-85 and California cases cited.
69. Walcot's Case, Holt, K.B. 680, 90 Eng. Rep. 1275 (1793); cf. Breitel,
Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 427 (1960).
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or at least until human nature radically changes. It is for that
reason that I struggle for objective, reasonable, and identifiable norms
to control trial court discretion in the area of criminal discovery, as
elsewhere. And I think the suggested distinction between typical





APPENDIX: CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN THE STATES*
ALABAMA
Criminal discovery at trial of documents other than admissible evidence is
left to the discretion of the trial court. The Court of Appeals of Alabama, in
affirming a conviction for conspiracy to commit mayhem, upheld the trial
court's discretion in refusing defendant's motion to compel the prosecution
to turn over police reports of interviews with state witnesses. Mabry v.
State, 40 Ala. App. 129, 110 So. 2d 250 (1959), cert. denied, 110 So. 2d 260
(Ala. 1959). See Redden, The Right of the Defendant to Discovery in
Criminal Prosecutions, 22 ALA. LAWYER 115 (1961).
ARIZONA
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Colvin, 81 Ariz. 388, 307 P.2d 98
(1957) confirmed the position it had taken one year earlier in State v.
Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956) of leaving pretrial discovery
to the discretion of the trial judge. In Calvin the court affirmed the trial
court's order denying a defendant accused of aggravated assault discovery of
statements of witnesses. In the Superior Court case it affirmed the trial
court's order requiring the prosecution to produce a transcript of the de-
fendant's statements made on deposition.
ARKANSAS
The law is in some conflict in Arkansas. In affirming a rape conviction, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the trial court had committed no error
in refusing to allow the defendant to depose the complaining witness. Bailey
v. State, 227 Ark. 889, 302 S.W.2d 796 (1957), rehearing denied, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 851 (1957). Yet the rationale of the court in Bates v. State, 210 Ark.
1014, 198 S.W.2d 850 (1947), in holding that the trial court did not err in
refusing to grant the defendant's motion for inspection of a statement by
one of the prosecution witnesses, was that the defendant "had just as much
right to interview the witness and take a statement in advance of trial
[as the state]."
CALIFORNIA
California has undoubtedly taken the lead in developing criminal discovery.
The situation there is discussed in detail in Loulsell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL=F. L. REv. 56, 74 (1961). See, e.g., Cash
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); Funk v. Superior Court,
52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959); Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92,
330 P.2d 773 (1958); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698
(1957). But see Clark v. Superior Court, 190 A.C.A. 820, 12 Cal. Rptr 191
(1961).
*This Appendix was prepared by Mr. Sheldon H. Wolfe, 3rd year student,
Law School (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley, research as-
sistant to Professor Louisell. It does not purport to be exhaustive, especially
in reference to devices which may perfom discovery functions but are not
conventionally classified as discovery measures, e.g., bills of particulars. SeeLousell, Criminal Discoveryj: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAUIF. L. REV.
56, 60 (1961). For a bibliography of criminal discovery, see id. at 57 n.2; 59n.9. Acknowledgment is made of help furnished by the availability of a brief
dated August 17, 1960, fied by the District Attorney of Contra Costa County,
California, in Cope v. Municipal Court, Civil No. 19,346, District Court of
Appeal, 1st App. fist., Div. One, California. In that case an order, apparently




Colorado is still apparently aligned with those states that leave defendant's
right of discovery to the discretion of the trial court, although both Rosier
v. People, 126 Colo. 82, 247 P.2d 448 (1952) and Walker v. People, 126 Colo.
135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952) cast some doubt on the authority of Struna v. People,
121 Colo. 348, 215 P.2d 905 (1950) (at trial) and Massie v. People, 82 Colo.
205, 258 Pac. 226 (1927) (pretrial), which had adopted the discretionary
approach in upholding the trial court's refusal of defendant's motion for'
discovery. In Walker the Supreme Court of Colorado made the general
statement that "the doctrine of discovery is therefore a complete and utter
stranger to criminal procedure." In Rosier the Court restricted defendant's
right of discovery to cases where he was able to show materiality of the
document and then only in "rare circumstances." However, the effect of
these cases is somewhat lessened by the fact that in both cases the trial
court had denied defendant's pretrial motion for discovery.
CONNECTICUT
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn.
124, 20 A.2d 613 (1941), affirming a sex-perversion conviction, held there
was no error in the trial court's refusal of a defense motion for the produc-
tion and inspection of stenographic notes of a detective's interview with the
complaining witness where no foundation of contradiction had been laid.
The state's attorney had given the document to the trial judge for his
consideration and the court refused to override the judge's discretion. How-
ever, it appears that there was no requirement that the state's attorney furnish
the document to the judge.
DELAWARE
The Superior Court of Delaware, in affirming a conviction for murder, held
that the defendant had no right to pretrial discovery of documents that dil
not constitute evidence. There are dicta to the effect that even at trial no
discovery would be permitted even for impeachment purposes unless the
witness' credibility was first put in issue. State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456, 134
A.2d 266 (1957). This rule was extended to preclude pretrial discovery of the
defendant's own statements in the hands of the prosecution. State v. Kupis,
37 Del. 27, 179 Atl. 640 (1935).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
As to the District of Columbia generally as a federal jurisdiction, see Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 68
(1961). The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
a bastardy proceeding, which is quasi-criminal in nature, held it was not
error to refuse defendant the opportunity to examine the complainant's
affidavit which was given to the prosecution in confidence. Fuller v. United
States, 65 A.2d 589 (D.C. App. 1949).
FLORIDA
It is apparently well settled case law in Florida that a defendant is not en-
titled as a matter of right to pretrial discovery of statements made by wit-
nesses to the prosecution, In both McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So. 2d
33 (1945) and Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956) the Florida Supreme
Court, affirming two murder convictions, upheld the trial court's refusal
to grant defendant's motion for pretrial discovery of the statements of
witnesses in the hands of the state's attorney. But see, especially in reference
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to Florida statutory provisions, Note, Discovery in Criminal Proceedings, 13
U. FLA. L. REv. 242 (1960).
GEORGIA
Georgia, evidently on the theory that witnesses are as available to the
defense as to the prosecution, denies the defendant the right to discovery
of statements made by witnesses to the prosecution. The Georgia Court of
Appeals, in affirming a murder conviction, held that the trial court's denial
of defendant's discovery motion at trial was not error. However, the court
was careful to distinguish the case of Wilson v. State, 93 Ga. App. 229, 91
S.E.2d 201 (1956) in which the defendant was denied the opportunity of
contacting the state's only witness. Bass v. State 98 Ga. App. 570, 106 S.E.2d
845 (1958). This doctrine was confirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court in
Walker v. State, 215 Ga. 128, 109 S.E.2d 748 (1959) upholding denial of
defendant's pretrial motion for discovery in a murder case.
IDAHO
The Idaho position on pretrial discovery is that it is limited to civil cases.
In Idaho Galena Mining Co. v. Judge of District Court, 47 Idaho 195, 273
Pac. 952 (1929) the supreme court issued a writ of prohibition against the
trial judge who had granted a motion for pretrial discovery in a criminal
libel suit. The authority of this case is somewhat weakened since the docu-
ments (business records) sought to be discovered were in the hands of
persons other than the prosecution. There is language indicating that a
subpoena duces tecum might have been appropriate.
ILLINOIS
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in affirming a robbery conviction, held there
was no absolute right to pretrial discovery of the transcript of the record
of a preliminary hearing. It upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion for inspection, People v. Murphy, 412 Ill. 458, 107 N.E.2d 748 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 899 (1952). The court adopted a somewhat more
liberal attitude toward motions at trial in People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142
N.E.2d 1 (1957). But see People v. Moretti, 6 Ill. 2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709
(1955) wherein the court affirmed a murder conviction and upheld the
trial court's denial of defendant's at-trial motion for discovery of documents
not sought to be introduced in evidence. See Grady, Discovery in Criminal
Cases, [1959] U. ILL. L.F. 827.
INDIANA
Pretrial discovery is at the discretion of the trial court. In affirming a con-
viction for assault and battery with intent to commit murder, the Supreme
Court of Indiana upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial
motion to inspect statements made by prosecution witnesses. Anderson v.
State, 156 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 1959). Dicta indicate a different result if the
defendant at trial supports a discovery motion by claiming that prior in-
consistent statements made by the witnesses would be beneficial to his
defense. See also Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958) (pre-
trial; real evidence).
IOWA
The Supreme Court of Iowa, while reversing a rape conviction on other
grounds, upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion
to inspect "all statements, investigations, reports and other evidence, in-
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cluding confessions, if any, that the State intends to use in the prosecution of
the above matter." State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1221, 91 N.W.2d 562 (1958).
KANSAS
In affirming a murder conviction, the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the
trial court's grant of defendant's pretrial motion for discovery on the
basis that in the absence of statutory authority the trial court was without
power. State v. Jeffries, 117 Kan. 742, 232 Pac. 873 (1925).
KENTUCKY
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in affirming a manslaughter conviction,
upheld the trial court's refusal to grant pretrial inspection of physical
evidence plus the defendant's confession. Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279
S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955). But see Arthur v. Commonwealth 307 S.W.2d 182
(Ky. 1957) (absolute right of inspection at trial).
LOUISIANA
Louisiana gives the defendant an absolute right to pretrial inspection of his
written confession. The Supreme Court of Louisiana so held in reversing
a murder conviction in State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945),
rehearing denied. The court was careful to limit the scope of inspection to
written confessions and has steadfastly refused to expand it. Following is
a list of cases wherein the court has upheld the trial court's denial of the
defendant's pretrial motion for discovery and inspection:
State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So. 2d 411 (1951) (co-defendant's confes-
sion); State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So. 2d 169 (1955) (defendant's oral con-
fession); State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So. 2d 305 (1957) (statements of
witnesses); State v. Matassa, 222 La. 363, 62 So. 2d 609 (1952) (physical
evidence-heroin); State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So. 2d 333 (1954) (written
confession where the state had declared its intent not to use the confession at
trial); State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So. 2d 801 (1947) (police reports);
State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
929 (1950) (statements of the defendant not amounting to a confession).
MASSACHUSETTS
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has ruled that there is no
pretrial inspection as of right but that the matter lies completely within the
discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66
N.E.2d 814 (1946) (murder; physical evidence); Commonwealth v. Chapin 333
Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 857 (1956) (murder;
defendant's confession).
MICHIGAN
The defendant's right to pretrial inspection is within the discretion of the
trial court. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the trial court's denial
of the defendant's motion for pretrial discovery of his confession and re-
manded on the basis that the trial court had failed to exercise its discretion
and had merely relied on the absence of statutory or judicial authority.
People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959).
MINNESOTA
In Minnesota there is no pretrial discovery as a matter of right. In Axilrod
v. State, 248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677 (1956) the supreme court, affirming a
murder conviction, upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's pretrial
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motion stating that the rules of civil procedure are inapplicable to criminal
cases. See also State v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912) where
the supreme court overruled the trial court's grant of the defendant's pretrial
motion to inspect a copy of his statement made to an investigating officer.
The court held that the trial judge could not justify his action as a matter
of right and that there was no basis for the exercise of his discretion.
MISSISSIPPI
There is no right to pretrial discovery of documents which are not them-
selves admissible in evidence. The Supreme Court of Mississippi so held, in
affirming an accessory-after-the-fact conviction and upholding the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to discover statements made by the
prosecution witness to the district attorney. Bellew v. State, 38 Miss. 734, 106
So. 2d 146, appeal dismissed, 360 U.S. 473 (1958).
MISSOURI
The only justification for pretrial inspection is if the object of inspection
is to be evidence at the trial. The Supreme Court in State v. McQueen, 296
S.W.2d 85 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1956) granted the state's motion for a writ of
prohibition against the circuit judge to prohibit him from enforcing a sub-
poena duces tecum and order for inspection of police records. The court
said, 296 S.W.2d at 90: "Can there be any doubt that discovery was a material
factor in procurement of the subpoena . . . ? We think not. We must hold
that the subpoena and the order to produce for inspection are illegal .... .
MONTANA
Unless the purpose of discovery is to produce evidence there is no right to
pretrial inspection in the absence of statute. The question is open as to
whether or not the trial court can even exercise discretion. In ,State v.
District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959), the supreme court granted
the state's motion for a writ of prohibition against the district court's
pretrial inspection order. The court evaded the discretion issue by holding
the defendant had failed to "show proper cause to move any discretion the
trial court might have."
NEBRASKA
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in upholding a murder conviction, affirmed
the trial court's action in denying the defendant's pretrial motion for dis-
covery of confessions and other documents in the possession of the state.
Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944). The court held that
there was no right to pretrial inspection unless the documents were admissible
in evidence in chief. However, the court did recognize the trial court's power
to exercise some discretion in this area.
NEVADA
Documents in possession of the state are susceptible to defendant's at-trial
motion for discovery even if their sole evidentiary value is for impeachment
purposes. In affirming the trial court's denial of such a motion, the Nevada
Supreme Court in State v. Bachman, 41 Nev. 197, 168 P. 733 (1917), held
that the defendant had failed to show that the confession of an accomplice
would have been admissible for any purpose.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
While enjoining the defendant, a murder suspect, from enforcing a pretrial
order for inspection of 15hotographs in the hands of the police the Supreme
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Court of New Hampshire stated the rule to be that there is no right to pre-
trial inspection in the absence of statute. State ex rel. Regan v. Superior
Court, 102 N.H. 224, 153 A.2d 403 (1959).
NEW JERSEY
There is no right to pretrial inspection of documents in general. However,
the trial court at its discretion may grant inspection of the defendant's
written confession. The Supreme Court of New Jersey so held in dismissing
the defendant's direct appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion
to inspect. State v. Cicenia 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568 (1951). In State v. Tune, 13
N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) the supreme court, in considering the state's
petition for certification, reversed that part of the trial court's order which
provided for defendant's inspection of his written confession. The court felt
that the trial court's action was an abuse of discretion in that the defendant
had failed to sustain the burden of proving the necessity of inspection in the
"interest of justice."
NEW MEXICO
The only reported New Mexico case which could be located in the field of
pretrial discovery and inspection follows; it has not been overruled or cited
by any subsequently reported case. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
in Territory v. McFarlane, 7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894), upheld a trial
court's denial of a pretrial motion for production of testimony taken before
the justice of the peace, holding that there was no statutory authority for
such inspection.
NEW YORK
The right to pretrial inspection is limited to documents which would them-
selves be admissible evidence. The rule was so stated in the leading case
of People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927),
wherein the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a writ of prohibition
granted by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court against the trial
court from enforcing its order compelling the production and inspection of
various documents. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show the
existence and the materiality of the evidence. People v. Marshall, 5 App. Div.
2d 352, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1958), aff'd, 188 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1959).
OHIO
There is no right to pretrial inspection. The Ohio Supreme Court so held
in sustaining the state's objections to the trial court's order compelling
production of the transcript of grand jury proceedings. The defendant had
been acquitted of bribery and the state brought exceptions. State v. Rhoads,
81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910). However, when the prosecution offers a
document in evidence the defendant of course has an absolute right to
inspect at trial. State v. Sharp, 162 Ohio St. 173, 122 N.E.2d 684 (1954).
OKLAHOMA
Ordinarily, unless documents in the county attorney's possession are evidence
themselves and are the very essence of the case, they should not be re-
quired for inspection in pretrial proceedings. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma so held in denying the defendant's petition for mandamus to,
compel the county attorney to make available a tape recording of conversa-
tions between the defendant and the county attorney. Application of Killion,




The defendant's right to pretrial inspection is at the discretion of the trial
court. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in affirming a murder conviction, found
the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying the defendant's
pretrial motion for inspection of his confession. State v. Leland, 190 Ore.
598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
PENNSYLVANIA
The accused has no right to pretrial inspection of evidence in possession of
the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334 (1955).
But cf. Petition of DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958), wherein the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the state's motion for a writ of pro-
hibition and upheld the trial court's order to compel the district attorney to
produce the alleged murder weapon upon defendant's pretrial motion for
inspection. However, the order was modified so that the district attorney
was not compelled to reveal photographs of fingerprints, if any, on the
weapon.
RHODE ISLAND
The trial court has discretion in special cases to relax the rigors of the com-
mon law rule against pretrial inspection by the accused. In affirming a
murder conviction the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found no error in
the trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion for inspection of
physical evidence in possession of the state. State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348,
195 Atl. 497 (1937), rehearing denied, 60 R.I. 37, 196 Atl. 795 (1938).
SOUTH DAKOTA
The trial court has inherent power to compel pretrial inspection of documents
"evidential in character." This was the rule espoused by the Supreme Court
of South Dakota in State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244
N.W. 100 (1932). The court there dismissed the state's petition for certiorari,
the circuit court having ordered the prosecution to allow inspection of certain
documents in the state's possession by the accused who was charged with
,theft by false pretenses.
TENNESSEE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Witham v. State, 191 Tenn. 115, 232
S.W.2d 3 (1950), in affirming a robbery conviction, held there was no error
by the trial court in denying the defendants' requests to examine their con-
fessions prior to their introduction at trial. See also Ivey v. State, 340 S.W.2d
907 (Tenn. 1960). Chapter 91 of the Public Acts of 1961 provides that the
Tennessee discovery statute [TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1201) shall not apply
to criminal proceedings.
TEXAS
There is no right to pretrial inspection until the moment the prosecution
offers the subject of the requested inspection in evidence. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, in affirming a murder conviction, upheld the trial court's
denial of the defendant's pretrial motion' to inspect his confession. Dowling
v. State, 317 S.W.2d 533 (1958). See also Pettigrew v. State, 163 Tex. Crim.
194, 289 S.W.2d 935 (1956) (photographs); Hill v. State, 319 S.W.2d 318
(1958) (statements by state's witnesses).
UTAH
In affirming an embezzlement conviction, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld
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the trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion to inspect docu-
ments in possession of the prosecution on the ground that there had been
no abuse of discretion. State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950).
VERMONT
The Supreme Court of Vermont, dismissing the defendant's exception to the
denial by the trial court of his motions to inspect the transcript of the
grand jury proceedings and to quash his indictment for murder, held that
the accused had no right to pretrial inspection and that the matter is left
within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167, 122
A.2d 862 (1956). As to defendant's rights of inspection at trial, see State v.
Lavallee, 163 A.2d 856 (Vt. 1960).
VIRGINIA
Virginia adopts the rule that the accused is not as a matter of right entitled
to inspect evidence in the hands of the prosecution previous to the trial. The
Supreme Court of Virginia so held, affirming a murder conviction and up-
holding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to inspect documents
which he had written, in the possession of the state. Abdell v. Common-
wealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939).
WASHINGTON
The general rule in Washington is that pretrial inspection is within the sole
discretion of the trial court. The supreme court, affirming and reversing
multiple abortion convictions, upheld the trial court's denial of the de-
fendant's pretrial motion for inspection. State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 171
P.2d 227 (1946). But discretion is a double-edged sword. The supreme court,
in dismissing the state's petition for certiorari to review the trial court's
order compelling production of an autopsy report for defendant's inspection,
held that the facts supported the exercise of the trial court's discretion in
sustaining the defendant's pretrial motion. The defendant was a juvenile,
indigent, a foreigner who had surrendered the documents prior to employ-
ment of counsel. State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 115, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
WEST VIRGINIA
There is no right to pretrial inspection of documents not offered in evidence
by the prosecution. The Supreme Court of West Virginia held in State v.
Tabet, 136 W.Va. 239, 67 S.E.2d 326 (1951), that the trial court had not
committed error in denying the pretrial motion of defendant who was con-
victed of murder.
WISCONSIN
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Herman, 219 Wis. 267, 262
N.W. 718 (1935), stated in affirming a criminal libel conviction that the rule
is well established that "one accused of crime enjoys no right to an in-
spection of evidence relied upon by the public authorities for his conviction."
(Wisconsin cases cited.)
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